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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PLEA AT YOUR PERIL: WHEN IS A VACATED PLEA STILL A
PLEA FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES?

AMANY RAGAB HACKING*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anti-immigrant sentiment continues to run high in the United States. Laws
passed and regulations adopted by administrations have made it easier for noncitizens to be deported. The Department of Justice, under President Barack
Obama, continues to enforce these laws and regulations.1
One method that immigration courts use to maintain the steady stream of
deportations from this country involves the removal of individuals who have
been convicted of a crime. Some regulations specifically provide that when
immigrants are convicted of certain crimes, they are to be deported.2 This
much is clear. However, this clarity becomes murky when immigration courts
handle convictions that have been subsequently vacated by state-court judges
and the prosecutors who obtained the convictions. Immigration courts,
displaying pro-deportation leanings, have exploited this murkiness by
completely disregarding properly vacated convictions. Most immigration
courts maintain the position that these convictions were vacated only to avoid
the harsh consequences of deportation, and as such, remain “convictions” for
purposes of immigration proceedings.
This paper argues that immigration judges should not be in the business of
second-guessing the motives behind local judges and prosecutors who
decide—for whatever reason—to vacate a guilty plea. While at least one
circuit court has taken steps towards limiting the discretion that immigration

* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law and Attorney. The
author wishes to acknowledge her research assistant, John Orbe, for his significant and invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article, and her husband James O. Hacking, III, an
immigration attorney, for his inspiration and insight.
1. Many cases have been decided on this issue since President Obama took office. See,
e.g., In re Cardenas Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009), vacated, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10498
(2d Cir. May 24, 2010); In re Almanza-Arenas, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2009); In re ZorillaVidal, 24 I&N Dec. 768 (BIA 2009); In re Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2009).
2. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1064–67 (2002). Criminal convictions
serving as the basis for removal can generally be classified as crimes of moral turpitude, drug
offenses, or aggravated felonies. Id.
459
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judges have in reviewing the rationale behind a vacated conviction, other
circuit courts have rejected such a clear approach. Indeed, this paper argues
the proper approach is this: if a state court decides to vacate a conviction,
federal immigration officials should honor that decision and treat the original
conviction as a nullity. Immigration officials should not be able to initiate or
continue removal proceedings based, in whole or in part, upon a conviction
that no longer exists. The approach advocated here follows the constitutional
mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and, more importantly, limits the
significant leeway that immigration courts presently afford themselves to
continue removing people who no longer have a criminal conviction on their
record.
The next section of this paper, Part II, discusses the fundamental question
of what constitutes a conviction. This seemingly simple question has resulted
in confusion and inconsistent results, leading Congress to adopt a federal
statute that answers the question once and for all. Next, Part III addresses the
difficulty in actually vacating a plea or a conviction. Part IV discusses
Pickering v. Gonzales. Parts V and VI analyze the Third Circuit’s decision in
Pinho v. Gonzales, and cases subsequent to Pinho, and suggest that the
approach of accepting the state trial judge and prosecutor’s decision to vacate a
plea or a conviction at face value is the proper approach.
II. WHAT IS A CONVICTION?
Prior to 1996, immigration law did not define the term “conviction”—the
Immigration and Nationality Act assumed the term had a common definition.3
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) routinely deferred to state
law “in determining whether an immigrant was ‘convicted.’”4 This lack of a
common federal definition produced confusion, as the states had varied
definitions of what constituted a “conviction.”5 This divergent approach
among the states created “difficulty in fashioning a uniform national
immigration policy with respect to prior convictions.”6 Lack of a uniform
policy created a “small uproar” in the immigration community.7 In Congress’s
view, the problem was that: “[t]here exist[ed] in the various [s]tates a myriad
of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a conviction. As a result, aliens

3. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2005); Ekwutozia U. Nwabuzor, Note,
The Cry of the Colossus: Discipio v. Ashcroft, Nonacquiescence, and Judicial Deference in
Immigration Law, 50 HOW. L.J. 575, 581 (2007).
4. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 205.
5. Nwabuzor, supra note 3, at 581–82 (stating that “[i]n the immigration context, the
myriad of state definitions caused confusion[,]” as “[m]any states also had various avenues for
post-conviction relief available to non-citizens who wished to avoid removal”).
6. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 205.
7. Nwabuzor, supra note 3, at 576.
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who ha[d] clearly been guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress
intended to be considered ‘convicted’ ha[d] escaped the immigration
consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”8 In an attempt to “close
the loopholes,”9 and settle any confusion, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).10
The IIRIRA sought to establish parameters for the term by defining a
conviction as:
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
11
alien’s liberty to be imposed.

The definition of “conviction” set out in the IIRIRA is the governing law
for immigration purposes.12 Thus, a disposition may be considered a
“conviction” for immigration purposes if it meets the federal definition, even if
it would not be considered a conviction in the state or jurisdiction of the
underlying proceeding.13 This definition proves helpful in certain cases;
however, given alternative sentencing approaches, as well as procedures to
“undo” convictions, all convictions are not created equal. Take for example,
cases with withheld or deferred adjudication, or cases seeking post-conviction
relief, discussed below.
A.

Withheld or Deferred Adjudication

In some instances, the sentencing court may convict the immigrant but
withhold sentencing if the immigrant complies with terms of probation. In

8. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996).
9. Nwabuzar, supra note 3, at 582–83.
A savvy criminal defense lawyer could successfully plea bargain her client to a
sentence that was one day less than the INA required for removal. Also, an otherwise
deportable non-citizen could successfully petition for post-conviction relief and have the
sentence ameliorated to avoid removal. Some felt that these discrepancies in the law led
many “eligible” criminal non-citizens escaping the reach of the INS.
Id. at 582.
10. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA], Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
11. IIRIRA § 332(a)(1). This definition modified the BIA definition for conviction in In re
Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).
12. Norton Tooby, Anatomy of a Conviction, in 39TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 171, 191–92 (Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Cynthia Juarez Lange
eds., 2006).
13. Id.
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Missouri, such an approach may result in a “suspended imposition of sentence”
(“SIS”)14 or a “suspended execution of sentence” (“SES”).15 This type of
withheld or deferred adjudication, where a penalty is applied,16 constitutes a
conviction for immigration purposes “based on the fact that the defendant must
enter a plea of guilty or no contest, and a punishment follows.”17 However, if
no penalty is subsequently applied, the second prong of the IIRIRA definition
is not met, and there is no conviction for immigration purposes.18
Similarly, when an immigrant-defendant enters a pretrial intervention or
diversion program, there is no conviction for immigration purposes.19 As
opposed to withheld adjudication discussed above, which requires a
probationary period after a plea, under a pretrial intervention or diversion
program, the probationary period is completed before a plea is ever entered.20
Thus, without a plea—no formal admission of guilt on the record—the first
prong of the IIRIRA definition is not satisfied, and there is no conviction for
immigration purposes.21 These, of course, are important options for an
immigrant-defendant to consider before accepting a guilty plea.
B.

Post-Conviction Relief

An area of special concern for immigrant-defendants is what effect postconviction relief, such as a vacated sentence, has on the underlying conviction
that may be the cause for their deportation. Dating back to the 1940s, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has held “an expunged conviction was
not a ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes, and adhered to that position with
only occasional exceptions. . . .”22 However, after the passage of the IIRIRA,
the BIA now interprets the new definition of “conviction” as creating “a
distinction between vacated convictions based on the reasons for the
vacatur.”23 Currently, post-conviction relief based on rehabilitation or
immigration hardship is still considered a conviction for immigration purposes,

14. See MO. REV. STAT. § 557.011.2(3) (2000).
15. See § 557.011.2(4).
16. See, e.g., In re Ozkok, 19 I&N at 546 (where the defendant’s penalty was three years of
probation and 100 hours of community service while the adjudication of guilt was deferred).
17. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN BORN DEFENDANTS 57 (2008).
18. Id. “Thus, where the court orders the defendant to pay ‘court costs,’ but no other penalty
is imposed, there is no conviction for immigration purposes.” Id. See also id. at 85 (citing a BIA
decision holding the mere imposition of court costs are not considered a punishment, thus no
conviction existed for immigration purposes).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).
23. Id. at 207.
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and therefore, a justification for deportation.24 In contrast, the BIA makes the
distinction that a conviction vacated on the merits because of procedural or
substantive infirmities does not.25 In considering the essence of a vacated plea,
immigration courts often ignore just how difficult it is for an immigrant to
actually vacate a plea or conviction.
III. VACATING PLEAS AND CONVICTIONS—EASIER SAID THAN DONE?
State-court prosecutors guard their convictions, and trial judges do not take
kindly to undoing a plea or conviction that took place in their courtroom and
on their watch. But, as discussed below, because it is so difficult to get a guilty
plea or conviction reversed on appeal, the immigration attorney is usually
forced to revisit the conviction at the trial level and seek relief there.
An immigrant facing removal may seek post-conviction relief in an effort
to have the conviction vacated.26 The purpose behind post-conviction relief is
“to afford a simple and efficient remedy to any prisoner who claims that his or
her conviction was obtained by a disregard of the fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice.”27 However, actually obtaining postconviction relief may be easier said than done.
In Missouri, post-conviction relief for a person convicted of a felony after
trial is governed by Supreme Court Rule 29.15.28 Those convicted of a felony
upon a plea of guilty must rely on Supreme Court Rule 24.035 for relief.29 An
individual seeking post-conviction relief under either rule must file a Missouri
Criminal Procedure Form No. 40, and therein state every claim known to
warrant relief from the conviction.30 If an appeal is taken, the motion must be
filed within 90 days after the mandate of the appellate court or 180 days after
the individual is delivered to the custody of the department of corrections if no
appeal is taken.31 These deadlines are mandatory, and “cannot be excused for
any reason.”32 The strict enforcement of filing deadlines, along with the grim
prospect of success, has led Rules 29.15 and 24.035 to be considered “veritable
forfeiture factories.”33 Given the low rate of success under the post-

24. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006).
25. Id.
26. See generally Robert G. Amsel, Avoiding Deportation by Vacating State Court
Convictions, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 351 (2006).
27. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 2223 (2006).
28. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009).
29. MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009).
30. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009); MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009). A copy of Form 40 is
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20011121194226/www.courtrules.org/fqno40mo.htm.
31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009); MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009).
32. Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack: Towards a New State Postconviction
Remedy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 337 (1992).
33. Id.
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conviction-relief statutes, an immigrant seeking to have a conviction vacated is
usually forced to seek relief in the original trial court. An immigration
attorney will reach out to the prosecutor who obtained the original guilty plea
and the state trial judge who accepted the original plea in order to determine if
there is any willingness to possibly vacate the conviction. In most instances,
either the trial judge or the prosecutor is unwilling to work with the
immigration attorney to fashion an alternative to the conviction on record.
Sometimes, however, the state court and the prosecutor will work with the
immigration attorney and, in some instances, are even willing to vacate the
conviction. This takes a tremendous amount of effort on the part of all
parties—especially the immigration attorney. Mr. James O. Hacking, III, an
immigration attorney in St. Louis, recently represented a woman facing
deportation who had pled guilty to three drug misdemeanors in Missouri state
court.34 The prosecutor in that instance was willing to consider vacating the
convictions, and the state court ultimately agreed due to the original defense
attorney’s failure to consider or inform the client of the almost-certain
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.35 Mr. Hacking prepared, and the
prosecutor consented to, a Joint Motion to Vacate the Convictions.
Subsequently, Mr. Hacking filed the Order signed by the trial judge vacating
the convictions with the immigration court. The Order specifically stated that
the convictions were vacated due to the constitutional infirmity attached to the
immigrant’s prior attorney’s failure to advise her of all possible consequences
of her plea, including immigration consequences. Upon receipt of this Order,
the immigration judge terminated the removal proceedings. In this case, the
state-court Order and the immigration judge accepted these reasons as stated.
The problem arises when immigration judges do not accept the stated reason

34. Allison Retka, Pleas Lead to Peril: Do Criminal Defense Attorneys Have a Duty to
Inform Clients About Possible Deportation?, MO. LAW. WKLY., at 1, Oct. 12, 2009.
35. The issue of whether or not a defense attorney has an obligation to consider and inform
an immigrant defendant of the possible deportation issues attendant to a state court guilty plea
was recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of over 40 years and Vietnam veteran, faced deportation
proceedings after pleading guilty to a drug offense. Padilla sought post-conviction relief claiming
he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense attorney failed to advise him of the
immigration consequences of his plea. Eventually, the issue reached the Supreme Court which
agreed with Padilla and held the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
included the duty to inform clients of potential immigrations consequences that may accompany a
plea or conviction. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla, immigrants seeking to
have a conviction vacated based on their trial counsel’s failure to inform them of immigration
consequences have a substantive ground for doing so. As such, judges should find vacated
convictions made under this premise valid for immigration purposes; however, what judges will
actually do remains to be seen—will they give effect to the vacatur, or hold that the conviction
was vacated only for immigration purposes?
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but rather second-guess state-court decisions in an attempt to determine the
perceived “true reasons” behind the state court’s decision to vacate.36
IV. SECOND-GUESSING STATE-COURT JUDGES: PICKERING V. GONZALES
In seeking to vacate a plea or conviction, as Mr. Hacking did above,
immigration attorneys must have a firm understanding of Pickering v.
Gonzales.37 This case established a stringent test for whether a vacated
conviction will still be considered a conviction for immigration purposes.
In 1980, Christopher Pickering pled guilty in his native Canada to the
unlawful possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”).38 Pickering later
moved to the United States with his family for his job.39 In 1996, Pickering’s
drug offense was pardoned and he applied to obtain lawful-permanent-resident
status; however, his application was denied.40 After the denial, Pickering
convinced a Canadian court to quash his conviction, but was again denied
permanent-resident status and removal proceedings were initiated.41
Ultimately, the immigration judge in the removal proceeding declined to give
effect to the Canadian court’s action, holding the conviction remained a
conviction for immigration purposes.42
On appeal, the BIA noted that “when a court vacates an alien’s conviction
for reasons solely related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration
hardships, rather than on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the
underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated for
immigration purposes.”43 In reaching its decision, the BIA relied on
Pickering’s notice of appeal to the Canadian court which stated “he was
appealing his conviction because of the bar it placed on his permanent
immigration to the United States,” as well as the absence of anything in the
record indicating what the Canadian court relied on to quash the conviction.44
As a result, the BIA reasoned the conviction was quashed solely for
immigration hardships, and thus still valid for removal purposes in light of
IIRIRA.45
The Sixth Circuit noted that the BIA appeared to have “imparted the
Petitioner’s motivation for seeking to have the conviction quashed onto the
36. See generally Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 265.
38. Id.
39. Id. (also stating that Pickering’s wife and children were granted permanent resident
status in 1993).
40. Id.
41. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 265–66 (6th Cir. 2004).
42. Id. at 266.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 267.
45. See id. at 266.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

466

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:459

Canadian court as its rationale for quashing the conviction,” which is of limited
relevance in reviewing the underlying purposes for the Canadian court’s
action.46 Rather than accept the BIA determination, the Court found the
record47 incomplete and lacking the actual basis for the Canadian court’s
decision.48 The Court did find relevance in the fact that Pickering appealed his
conviction pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
required a Canadian court to conclude Pickering’s rights under the statute that
had been purportedly violated.49 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held the record
did not support the BIA’s findings, rather the BIA had “relied on certain parts
of the Petitioner’s affidavit and notice of appeal, while minimizing or ignoring
other parts.”50 The Court reversed the BIA decision stating “the evidence
supporting deportation can hardly be described as ‘clear and convincing.’”51
Although the Sixth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision, the Court also held
that the BIA “correctly interpreted the law” with regards to a conviction
vacated for immigration reasons remaining a conviction for immigration
purposes.52 It is this language from Pickering that has allowed subsequent
immigration courts to ignore state-court decisions to vacate a conviction when
the immigration courts believe that immigration consequences motivated the
vacatur.
For example, in In re Langley,53 the BIA concluded that the immigrant
remained “convicted” of a felony for immigration purposes despite the fact that
a Montana state court vacated the felony conviction and entered a
misdemeanor conviction instead.54 Rather than accepting the Montana court’s
decision to vacate the felony conviction, the BIA looked to the state court’s
order and conviction documents, which the BIA felt did not “identify the legal
basis for the decision to grant the [Respondent’s Motion to Vacate].”55
However, the BIA noted that during proceedings, the state court judge
indicated “the modified resolution of this case is in response to the possibility
that [the immigrant] . . . could be deported . . . .”56 In light of this remark, the

46. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2004).
47. The record did not include a record of the Canadian hearing or reveal any basis for that
court’s action. Id. at 267, 269 (6th Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 268.
50. Id. at 269.
51. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 269–71 (6th Cir. 2004). Id. at 269–71.
52. Id. at 266, 267.
53. In re Langley, File: A73 385 650 - Seattle, 2004 WL 1739155 (BIA June 29, 2004),
aff’d, . 182 F. App’x 641, 642 (9th Cir. 2006).
54. Id. (also stating that the felony conviction rendered respondent removable, while the
misdemeanor conviction would not).
55. Id.
56. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

PLEA AT YOUR PERIL

467

BIA determined the felony was vacated for immigration purposes, and thus
remained a felony conviction rendering the respondent removable.57
Similarly, in Sanusi v. Gonzales,58 the Sixth Circuit concluded that an
Arkansas state court vacated the defendant’s conviction solely to avoid
immigration consequences, leaving the man “convicted” for immigration
purposes.59 Sanusi, a native of Indonesia, was cited in Arkansas for property
theft.60 The misdemeanor carried a maximum possible sentence of one year,
which made it a removable offense for immigration purposes.61 In lieu of a
court appearance, Sanusi opted to pay a $600 fine.62 Several years later,
removal proceedings were initiated against Sanusi, leading him to ask the
Arkansas court to vacate the theft conviction.63 In his petition to vacate,
Sanusi acknowledged that the only way to avoid deportation was to have his
conviction vacated.64 Additionally, he asserted that the procedure the
Arkansas court established to expeditiously resolve the matter did not
contemplate the severe consequences for aliens who would face deportation by
simply paying the fine.65 The Arkansas court granted Sanusi’s petition to
vacate his conviction without providing any explanation for doing so.66
Nevertheless, an immigration judge, the BIA, and the Sixth Circuit all
successively concluded the Arkansas court granted the vacatur petition for
immigration purposes.67 The Sixth Circuit concluded that because Sanusi’s
petition cited his pending immigration consequences without providing a
colorable legal ground for a vacatur, his “conviction was vacated for the sole
purpose of relieving Sanusi from deportation.”68 Because the Court concluded
his conviction was vacated to avoid immigration hardships, Sanusi remained
“convicted” for immigration purposes.69
The manner in which immigration courts and the BIA now interpret
Pickering allows these courts tremendous freedom—undoubtedly too much

57. Id.
58. Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2007).
59. See generally id. For other cases refusing to accept a state court vacatur, and instead
finding the defendant still “convicted” for immigration purposes, see Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d
17 (2d Cir. 2007).
60. Sanusi, 474 F.3d at 343.
61. Id.
62. Id. Of the total amount, $500 was for a “criminal fine” and $100 was for “criminal
costs.” Id. Paying the fine amounted to a guilty plea as to the property theft charge, thus leaving
Sanusi convicted of the charge. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 343–44 (6th Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 344.
67. Id. at 344–45, 347–48.
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id. at 347–48.
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freedom—to second-guess the motives of state-court prosecutors and judges
who decide, for whatever reason, to vacate a conviction. Due-process
concerns are implicated as there is no certainty of outcome for immigrants
facing deportation and there is no hard-and-fast standard to be used. There is
too much reliance upon the immigration courts “guessing” why the particular
conviction was vacated. A need exists for a more objective standard.
Moreover, an immigrant-defendant is not given the opportunity to present
evidence as to the actual motives of the state-court judge and/or prosecutor in
deciding to vacate the conviction.
In addition, this “super” review by federal immigration courts runs afoul of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.70 Federal
administrative agencies and courts are required by the Constitution to give full
faith and credit to decisions by state courts. Allowing immigration courts to
try and glean the “real motives” behind decisions to vacate a plea or conviction
strips the state courts of the very authority to vacate the plea or conviction.
Viewed in a benign light, the problem is simply one of allowing
immigration courts too much leeway in their treatment of vacated pleas or
convictions.
However, viewed slightly differently, the post-Pickering
approach gives the immigration courts free rein to declare by fiat that a
particular vacated plea or conviction does not pass muster and to then void
state-court decisions.
It has been the unfortunate experience of numerous immigration attorneys
to have presented clear and unequivocal vacated convictions to the
immigration court, only to have them discounted or completely disregarded.
These courts frequently place the burden—either explicitly or implicitly—
upon the immigrant and the attorney to prove that the court’s decision to vacate
a conviction was not done for immigration purposes. This approach runs
contrary to the requirement that the government show removability by clear
and convincing evidence.71
These fundamental defects with Pickering need to be remedied through a
bright-line rule. The Third Circuit moved toward a clearer, more sensible
approach in the case of Pinho v. Gonzales. 72
V. PINHO V. GONZALES
In Pinho, the Third Circuit established a categorical test to guide the
determination of when a vacated criminal conviction remains a “conviction”

70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“In the proceeding the Service has the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted
to the United States, the alien is deportable.”).
72. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2005).
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for removal purposes.73 The Court expressed its disapproval of the BIA’s
procedures that “require [sic] speculation about, or scrutiny of, the reasons for
judges’ actions other than those reasons that appear on the record.”74 Judge D.
Michael Fisher recognized the pitfalls of the BIA’s dubious approach to
examining the underlying reasons for a vacatur stating:
Were we to allow the Department of Homeland Security to base its legal
determinations of immigrants’ statutory eligibility for adjustment status upon
hypothetical scenarios . . . we would be opening the door to—indeed in many
cases due process would require—a flood of subpoenas to judges and
prosecutors of sovereign states ordering them to appear in federal immigration
proceedings to answer questions about motives, feelings, and sympathies that
appear nowhere in the record, but may have prompted their official action . . .
75
[W]e see the specter of such unseemly inquisitions.

Aside from the absurdity of such a process,76 Judge Fisher acknowledged
that considerations of comity and federalism require deference to the statecourt decisions.77 Perhaps most significant in the Pinho decision is Judge
Fisher’s recognition of the need for a bright-line rule regarding the status of
vacated convictions: if immigrants are to have any certainty as to the effect that
state court criminal proceedings may have on their immigration status, those
bounds must be drawn plainly and brightly.78 Accordingly, Judge Fisher
proceeded to announce a simple test that proves useful for future courts that
may encounter similar issues:
To determine the basis for a vacatur order, the agency must look first to the
order itself. If the order explains the court’s reasons for vacating the
conviction, the agency’s inquiry must end there. If the order does not give a
clear statement of reasons, the agency may look to the record before the court
79
when the order was issued. No other evidence of reasons may be considered.

VI. POST-PINHO
Some courts have been receptive to the Pinho rationale for a categorical
test to determine whether an alien is convicted for immigration purposes under
Pickering. For instance, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the Pinho test in Cruz v.
Attorney General.80 In Cruz, the BIA denied the appeal of a removal order for
73. Id. See also Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction and the Lost Cause
of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 689–90 (2008).
74. Id. at 212.
75. Id. at 211–12.
76. Id. at 212 (“Whether or not constitutional avoidance requires this result, avoidance of
absurdities surely does.”).
77. Id.
78. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 215.
79. Id.
80. Cruz v. Attorney Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2006).
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an immigrant whose conviction was subsequently vacated.81 The BIA reached
its decision based on the timeliness of Cruz’s appeal, without deciding whether
he remained convicted under Pickering.82 The Third Circuit ultimately
remanded to the BIA to consider whether Cruz remained convicted for
immigration purposes.83 In so doing, the Court suggested the Pinho test must
be applied to all similar cases by stating: “Even if we assume that the BIA
rejected the argument that Cruz’s conviction had been vacated for immigration
purposes, we could not affirm that determination without assuring ourselves
that the Board had reached this conclusion in accordance with the categorical
test we established in Pinho.”84
In re Escobar-Guerra85 took Pinho a step further by applying the
categorical test to the facts.86 In this case, the BIA faced a decision on whether
a vacated conviction was substantive or rehabilitative.87 In making the
determination, the BIA noted the state court was silent as to its rationale for
vacating the underlying conviction.88 Thus, under the second prong of the
Pinho test, the BIA’s analysis shifted to the record produced when the vacating
order was issued.89 The BIA reasoned that because the respondent’s
unopposed motion to vacate the conviction cited ineffective representation for
support, the state court’s vacatur was based on substantive grounds.90
However, not all courts have received the Pinho decision in the same
manner. For instance, the court in Rumierz v. Gonzales91 distinguished Pinho
and in so doing, reached a result the Pinho test hoped to avoid.92 Rumierz,
faced with deportation proceedings, petitioned a Vermont state court for relief
from his underlying criminal conviction.93 The Vermont court granted
Rumierz’s petition;94 however, the order vacating the underlying conviction
was silent as to the grounds.95 Additionally, an affidavit filed later stated “the
merits of [Rumierz’s] claim were not addressed or adjudicated” in connection

81. See id. at 243.
82. Id. at 248.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In re Escobar-Guerra, File: A96 263 387 - York, 2006 WL 3485830 (BIA Oct. 12,
2006).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2006).
92. Id. at 49.
93. See id. at 34.
94. Id. (stating that the Vermont court struck Rumierz’s conviction for possession of stolen
property and amended it to negligent operation of a motor vehicle).
95. Id.
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with the order vacating the conviction.96 Instead of looking to the record as the
Pinho test directs, the BIA placed the burden on the petitioner to show his
vacatur was based on substantive grounds.97 The First Circuit upheld this
procedure, which goes against the Pinho test.98 Under the Pinho test,
Rumierz’s conviction would remain vacated because the record did not show
the Vermont court was motivated by immigration considerations. For the same
reason, Rumierz could not satisfy the burden the court placed on him of
showing that the vacatur was not motivated by immigration hardships.99 Thus,
despite his vacated conviction, the court held Rumierz remained “convicted,”
and therefore, removable.100
VII. CONCLUSION
Immigrants in this country are facing higher and higher hurdles in their
fight to resist removal. This is particularly true for immigrant-defendants who,
although successful in vacating a plea or conviction, can still be removed on
the basis of that vacated plea or conviction because immigration judges are
able to second-guess the motives behind the local judges and prosecutors who
made that decision. While the Third Circuit in Pinho established a test to
guide the determination of when a vacated criminal conviction remains a
“conviction” for removal purposes,101 subsequent courts have not necessarily
followed it, leading to uncertainty and confusion.
As Judge Fisher recognized in Pinho, permitting immigration judges to
base their deportation decisions on “hypothetical scenarios,” not supported by
the legal record or perhaps making the immigrant-defendants create a record
whereby local judges and prosecutors would be hauled into immigration court
to testify regarding their reasons for vacating a plea or conviction, is hardly
sensible.102 All of this, of course, as Judge Fisher acknowledged, also ignores
considerations of comity and federalism requiring deference to the state-court
decisions.103 Finally, and as this paper argues, most significantly, is Judge
Fisher’s recognition in the Pinho decision of the need for a bright-line rule
regarding the status of vacated convictions.104
Perhaps the Pinho decision did not go far enough in establishing a brightline rule that would create certainty and consistency in an immigration court’s
96. Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2006).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 35–39. The dissent sharply criticized the majority’s decision for failure to apply the
Pinho test. Id. at 44–54.
99. Id. at 40–42.
100. Id. at 44.
101. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2005).
102. See id. at 211–12.
103. Id. at 212.
104. Id. at 215.
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handling of an immigrant’s vacated plea or conviction. Pinho suggests that an
immigration court should first look to the state-court order to determine the
basis for the vacatur, and if the order states the reason or reasons for vacating
the conviction, then that is accepted without further review.105 If, however, the
order fails to provide “a clear statement of reasons, the agency may look to the
record before the court when the order was issued. No other evidence of
reasons may be considered.”106 This approach permits (perhaps, requires) the
immigration court to review the reason or reasons for a state court’s decision to
vacate a plea or conviction. It is this type of review and discretion by the
immigration courts that has created uncertainty and confusion for immigrants
facing deportation.
This paper respectfully suggests that the rule in Pinho can be even more
simplified—for immigrants as well as immigration courts who should not be
burdened with the responsibility to determine the state court’s and prosecutor’s
underlying motives for vacating a plea or conviction. This bright-line rule
would simply state that if an immigrant’s plea or conviction has been
vacated—regardless of the reason, stated or otherwise—it cannot then be used
as a basis for removal. Simply put, immigration officials should not be able to
initiate or continue removal proceedings based, in whole or in part, upon a
conviction that no longer exists. The approach advocated here follows the
constitutional mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and, more
importantly, limits the significant discretion that immigration courts presently
have in removing people who no longer have a criminal conviction on their
record.

105. Id.
106. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2005).

